Book Discussion on The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy
Paul Rahe’s The Spartan Regime: Its Character, Origins, and Grand Strategy takes a unique angle on grand strategy. A classicist and political philosopher by background, Rahe has previously published on Montesquieu, Machiavelli, and Rousseau, relating to the influence of antiquity on modern political philosophy. The Spartan Regime, published in 2016, was his first book-length foray into classical history as such, and served as an introduction to his five-part history of Spartan grand strategy in the 5th century BC (the last of which was published in 2024). It looks at the formation and character of the Spartan state before the 5th century, when it established itself as a leading player in the Greek world.
My interest in this book was how it describes grand strategy as something that naturally flows from domestic politics in a way that other levels of war do not. Rahe notes in the introduction how ancient political philosophers discussed Sparta’s uniqueness in terms of the politeuma (the structure of the ruling order) and paideia (upbringing of those members), and proposes doing the same as a means of understanding her foreign policy in the turbulent 5th century. Below are my notes/synopsis followed by a discussion.
Synopsis
Prologue
The opening section frames the challenge of understanding the Spartan state:
Disagreement among ancient philosophers about the nature of its constitution: whether it was a tyranny, extreme democracy, monarchy, oligarchy, etc.
Relationship between different offices created some ambiguity, as did relations between the rich and poor
Debates continued into modernity: was it a model for liberty, or did it contain the seeds of fascism.
Difficulties compounded by the secretiveness of the Spartans, philosophers’ idealizations of the state, the later time periods at which many of them wrote.
Enough can nevertheless be extracted from these accounts to shed light on how these domestic concerns shaped grand strategy
Paideia
This chapter looks at the upbringing of Spartan youth, designed to make them capable of serving a state which stood out as completely unique among other Greek poleis.
Total focus on producing skilled warriors who exhibited homonoia—like-mindedness/spiritedness
Prohibition on learning any trades, infanticide of the weak or deformed
Ultimate purpose was that those who made it through would receive a kleros (grant of public land) and be admitted to full citizenship—which entailed a strict conformity in outward appearance
Elite unity and military prowess were needed to keep down the helots, the descendants of the Achaean Greeks enserfed by the Spartans’ Dorian ancestors—the basis of their agricultural wealth
Spartans were a small minority in their homeland, dependent on allies elsewhere in the Peloponnese (the perioikoi) in times of war
Constant threat of war and the high stakes of defeat compelled the Spartans to instill a high level of courage and fear of the gods in their young via the agoge
This began at the age of seven, when boys were taken from their home and enrolled in a “herd” of peers
Education consisted of rigorous exercise, dance, and songs designed to physically condition them and build group spirit
Given short rations that forced them to steal food: were expected to endure inevitable punishments for theft
Poetry/song fostered group feeling and served a didactic purpose: many songs were about discipline in the face of danger and valorized fighting skill
Final test of the agoge came around the age of 20, living for a year on his own resourcefulness in the countryside, killing any helots who violated curfew
Passing this final test allowed entry into one of several sussitia, the dining clubs to which all Spartan citizens belonged, and which served as their residence up to the age of 45.
Three ablest initiates of each class were each tasked with choosing 100 peers who served as the royal bodyguard
Institutionalized pederasty: boys were expected to court older men who acted as surrogate fathers while going through the agoge
Relations with women were much more furtive: marriages were made through ritualized bride-abduction, wives were only seen at night
Taken together, these were intended to reduce private loyalties and make the community the Spartiate’s primary loyalty
This intense collectivization made Spartans notoriously avaricious within the confines of their own home (after the age of 45) or when abroad
Nevertheless, Spartan paideia created a class that was renowned for its courage, unwilling to shirk combat in the presence of fellow Spartans
Politeia
This section looks at the political makeup of Sparta, emphasizing that the formal distinction between state and society did not exist, with attendant consequences for their understanding of offices and parties.
How the attempt to suppress faction and social distinction led to men to seek honor through battle
Sparta’s founding myth:
The two kings: led the army out in battle, conducted sacrifices on campaign, conducted foreign policy
Great power to influence men with endowments of property—playing to Spartans’ private avarice
Ephors, or overseers: board of five members over the age of 45 elected for one year, only eligible for a single term in a lifetime
Had to give an accounting for their deeds to oncoming ephors at the end of their term
Enforced standards within Sparta: sumptuary laws, censoring the arts, physically examining the young men, oversaw the treasury and payment of taxes
Had the power to try and condemn kings, a power frequently wielded—only three kings in the 5th century were not tried for a crime
Accountability to their successors created a balance of power with the kings, especially when both kings were aligned on policy
The Gerousia, or elders: body of twenty-eight men over the age of 60 who tried cases and whose consent was necessary for any law to be passed or war declared; generally consulted on administrative matters
Candidates canvassed for support, indications that factions split between the two kings in promoting certain ones
Contemporaries observed that a council of old men had the greatest interest in stability, least moved by passion to make rash decisions
The three formal offices created a mixed constitution: monarchy (two kings), oligarchy (ephors), aristocracy (Gerousia), while retaining democratic assemblies of the citizens; contributed to enforcing strict social regimentation
Conquest
This chapter covers Sparta’s expansion in the Peloponnese, from the state’s origins in the myth-shrouded Dorian invasion to the conquest and subjugation of the Messenians.
Legend of the descendants of Heracles, who had been expelled from their kingdoms in the Peloponnese in the aftermath of the Trojan War and recovered their patrimony with the aid of the Dorians—another Hellenic tribe not native to the region
Explains the origins of the two royal dynasties (said to be Heracliads) and how the Dorians came to rule the native Achaeans of the Peloponnese
Also explains traditional hostility to Argos, then preeminent power in the region
Archaeological evidence of major settlement at Sparta only emerges in later 10th century, which then expanded to all of Laconia
Conquest of Messenia, in the southwestern Peloponnese, in the later 8th century: reducing its population to bondage, creating the basis for a narrow Spartan elite
Military revolution: close-order hoplite warfare, appearing to radiate from Argos around the time of the Messenian wars
Reduced the status of the mounted aristocracy, created an imperative for a close-knit warrior class composed of all Spartan citizens
Second Messenian War: revolt of the helots, eventually defeated by Sparta
Dating is uncertain, but occurs sometime around a Spartan defeat by Argos in 669—the two were undoubtedly related
Politics and Geopolitics
This section shows how Spartan grand strategy was shaped by wars with Argos and Messenia.
Discussion of the timeline of the establishment of Spartan governing institutions
Possible establishment of the ephorate on the verge of the First Messenian War.
Origins of the agoge in early Dorian tribal history
Geographical difficulties in the expansion from Laconia
Shaped the particular nature of Spartan dominance in Messenia, encouraging the establishment of colonies to enforce rule
Geography limited further expansion to the north, leading to defeat by Tegea
Failures to expand led to shift in policy toward neighbors, trying to make them allies instead of helots—perioikoi who would fight alongside them
Sparta’s reputation for ousting tyrants and installing friendly oligarchic regimes by late 6th century
This reflected a change in policy from conquest of neighbors to forming alliances with them against Argos. Kings emphasized their common “Achaean-ness” over Sparta’s Dorian roots.
Sum total of these changes made Sparta a “satiated power” wishing to preserve a tenuous status quo:
Resulted from lack of manpower to conquer neighbors—Spartiates never numbered more than 10,000
Sparta formed alliances with every major in the Peloponnese except Argos
Development of network of cart roads (built on a single gauge) linking those cities
Conclusion
The conclusion draws all the strands together, defining Spartan hegemony by the late 6th century as “a grand alliance designed to keep their Argive enemies out, the helots down, and the Arcadians, above all others, in.” The fatal flaw was that this only worked if the Peloponnese was an isolated world—setting the stage for the conflicts covered in Rahe’s next 5 books.
Discussion
Rahe is something of a throwback, in that he takes political philosophy seriously—before publishing any books on the ancient world, his scholarship focused on republicanism and early modern political theorists. Political philosophy has been out of fashion for several generations, but has benefitted from its time out in the cold. Archaeology has given us a better sense of the material conditions of ancient societies, giving us much more context to contemporary accounts of their political institutions.
This is especially useful in the case of Sparta, which was obscure in its origins, secretive in its conduct of affairs, and utterly unique in its society and institutions. Rahe convincingly shows how particular strategic challenges shaped the Lacedaemonian constitution, and how that in turn shaped their approach to the outside world.
Elsewhere, I’ve argued that grand strategy is inherently an expression of domestic politics in a way that strategy is not. Popular opinion might sway the conduct of a war (i.e. strategy), but that is usually seen as an unwelcome intrusion on the efficient pursuit of national priorities; defining those national priorities is another matter, the very essence of politics itself. What is unique about Sparta is the degree to which all of society was organized around a very particular grand strategic vision. By the end of the 6th century, it combined an extremely high state of military readiness with an extreme reluctance to go to war, born out of the precarity of their very social structure.
In the fixed course of its grand strategy and the way that a quasi-republic was able to suppress fractiousness, Sparta resembles nothing so much as Venice—its opposite by nearly every other measure. Both states promoted a certain egalitarianism within the ruling class by directing all their political energies into exercise of one sort or another: the Spartans through a rigorous military regimen, the Venetians with an elaborate system of annual and quarterly elections which absorbed the time and energy of anyone with political ambitions. Both systems were also explicit gerontocracies, closing off most higher offices to anyone younger than 60, with the explicit intention of making policy more cautious and conservative. Taken together, the program political homogeneity and conservatism served both states fairly well, seeing them through the turbulence of the 5th century BC and 16th century AD, respectively, even if it left them unable to chart a new course over the longer run.
That is not to say that even a society as uniform as Sparta’s did not have disagreements over foreign policy. Their strict foreign policy framework still left room for differences of opinion on particular questions of whether to go to war and how to wage it. Rahe moreover emphasizes in his chapter on the Spartan politeia that parties and faction before the 19th century operated very differently from the formal party system most Western democracies have today. An analogy might be America’s current divide over China, which cuts across party lines: some see China primarily as a military threat, while another, guided by specific business interests and general economic interdependence, prefer a less adversarial approach.
Overall, I found the The Spartan Regime an illuminating framing of Sparta’s grand strategy in the Classical Age and a useful tool for thinking about the formulation of grand strategy in general. I look forward to reading Rahe’s following books on the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.
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