Last piece looked at conflicts that get entangled with one another, metastasizing into sprawling coalitionary wars fought in multiple theaters. The common element is diverging strategic objectives: when allies are fighting for separate war aims, they have the tendency to prolong and intensify the conflict. So too when a single power fights for separate strategic objectives in different theaters, as the Americans did against the Germans and Japanese and as the British did in various colonial struggles during the Seven Years’ War. Efforts in one theater necessarily come at the expense of the other, requiring the enlistment of local allies while delaying victory.
British subsidies to German land armies; In any land war prior to the completely ruinous and counterproductive to the British Empire World wars of the 20th century, the Germans were often enough the main land effort if not THE main effort on land. I refer to Marlborough, Frederick in the Seven Years War, Blucher at Waterloo… France a different matter, but the British were ruined by land armies against Germany in the World Wars, and the Cold War Army of the Rhine wasn’t cheap either.
“strategic burden they had to bear to maintain the strength of their coalition, like the subsidies France and Britain paid to their German allies in the 18th century.”
That was a reference to the last piece, probably should have fleshed it out more. Was drawing a distinction between support of Frederick in the 7YW or the Austrians in the 1740s, which was primarily aimed at distracting the French while the British focused on Hanover (their main continental concern); and support for coalition partners during the Spanish Succession or Napoleonic Wars, where they shared the same strategic objectives.
I’m making the point that England had more success with gold on land and limited if highly effective redcoats than massed armies.
I’m also on a mission to convince my compatriots the French and Indian war wasn’t the main point at the time… just a highly successful theater of using mostly local troops.
So successful they were Independent a generation later.
Makes me think of the graph of Britain's sovereign debt over the last three centuries...grows steadily through the 18th century and spikes to staggering heights by 1815, but then plummets after that once the Empire has been secured.
The Soviet invasion and occupation of Bulgaria and the other East European states, including former German Allies, often also saw them field additional forces recruited in Eastern Europe and incorporating any remaining forces still in the field at the time of their surrender to the Red Army. Regarding North Africa, I recently read in Kershaw's Fateful Choices how that campaign might have worked out differently. With Operation Barbarossa looming, Hitler was looking for an renewed Italian offensive in Africa to overrun British controlled Egypt and potentially threaten the Soviet Union's southern flank (and perhaps bringing Turkey into the war as a German ally). Mussolini, however, in a fit of pique instead acted on long term ambitions and sent Italian forces against Greece where they failed and had to be bailed out by German forces diverted from preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union. IF the time and forces spent in the invasion of Greece had instead been against Egypt there's a good chance that they would have succeeded (and ironically set up a situation in which Greece would have to acquiesce to become part of a new Italian Empire.
Really goes to show how haphazard strategy usually is, almost never the rational & orderly pursuit of objectives. Worth noting too that the invasion of Greece drew British forces away from Egypt - lots of unintended consequences.
British subsidies to German land armies; In any land war prior to the completely ruinous and counterproductive to the British Empire World wars of the 20th century, the Germans were often enough the main land effort if not THE main effort on land. I refer to Marlborough, Frederick in the Seven Years War, Blucher at Waterloo… France a different matter, but the British were ruined by land armies against Germany in the World Wars, and the Cold War Army of the Rhine wasn’t cheap either.
“strategic burden they had to bear to maintain the strength of their coalition, like the subsidies France and Britain paid to their German allies in the 18th century.”
That was a reference to the last piece, probably should have fleshed it out more. Was drawing a distinction between support of Frederick in the 7YW or the Austrians in the 1740s, which was primarily aimed at distracting the French while the British focused on Hanover (their main continental concern); and support for coalition partners during the Spanish Succession or Napoleonic Wars, where they shared the same strategic objectives.
Oh, no disagreement really.
I’m making the point that England had more success with gold on land and limited if highly effective redcoats than massed armies.
I’m also on a mission to convince my compatriots the French and Indian war wasn’t the main point at the time… just a highly successful theater of using mostly local troops.
So successful they were Independent a generation later.
Makes me think of the graph of Britain's sovereign debt over the last three centuries...grows steadily through the 18th century and spikes to staggering heights by 1815, but then plummets after that once the Empire has been secured.
Yes… but…
… uh
Indian Gold = Gold Standard
Don’t tell the Gold Bugs.
😂
The Soviet invasion and occupation of Bulgaria and the other East European states, including former German Allies, often also saw them field additional forces recruited in Eastern Europe and incorporating any remaining forces still in the field at the time of their surrender to the Red Army. Regarding North Africa, I recently read in Kershaw's Fateful Choices how that campaign might have worked out differently. With Operation Barbarossa looming, Hitler was looking for an renewed Italian offensive in Africa to overrun British controlled Egypt and potentially threaten the Soviet Union's southern flank (and perhaps bringing Turkey into the war as a German ally). Mussolini, however, in a fit of pique instead acted on long term ambitions and sent Italian forces against Greece where they failed and had to be bailed out by German forces diverted from preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union. IF the time and forces spent in the invasion of Greece had instead been against Egypt there's a good chance that they would have succeeded (and ironically set up a situation in which Greece would have to acquiesce to become part of a new Italian Empire.
Really goes to show how haphazard strategy usually is, almost never the rational & orderly pursuit of objectives. Worth noting too that the invasion of Greece drew British forces away from Egypt - lots of unintended consequences.