As the historian who took down the myth of the 'cabinet strategy' of Louis XIV, let me say: you are half right. He was more interfering regarding the Flanders theatre than the others, but with Italy and Spain he really had to let go other than reminding commanders to stay within the overall broad strategic parameters. But to say he had no command experience is simply wrong: he commanded actively on campaign and directed sieges actively; he merely did not command a field army in battle. And were he and Lincoln really of different temperaments? Both men seem to me to be able to maintain considerable composure and calmness - at least in public - when under pressure.
Technically, Lincoln commanded troops in the field too (at Norfolk), but I wouldn’t class that as true field experience. What sort of command did Louis actually exercise? I was always under the impression that it was about the same as his successor in the 1740s.
Re micro-managing: my point was really about those strategic parameters than the operational-level details - even in Germany and Italy, they were often far stricter than his marshals would have liked.
Thanks for the response to my response. Louis XIV very much directed his field armies when on campaign with them - it was not like Louis XV deferring to Saxe. But of course Louis XIV listened to those marshals he were with him, and discussed things with them - and with his brother Philippe and his Conde cousin when they were there too. There was more deference in 1667-68, but by the Dutch War he is firmly in the decision-making seat when he is on campaign. I see Louis XIV as more than just a chair of councils of war, but as an executive head when on campaign - but he was extremely conscious that monarchs took advice and only tyrants did not. Glad you have picked up on the difference between operational level leeway and setting the strategic direction - the operational interference was greatest in Flanders, then Germany; and then it drops off considerably for Northern Italy and Catalonia/Spain, and after 1703 in Spain he more or less has to abdicate control over strategy to a tandem of Felipe V's government and his own commander in Iberia. If interested beyond this, do look at Jean-Philippe Cenat's Le roi stratege monograph.
A really good book of case studies on the how current and previous polities approaches this challenge is “The Making of Strategy” by Williamson, Knox, Bernstein.
As the historian who took down the myth of the 'cabinet strategy' of Louis XIV, let me say: you are half right. He was more interfering regarding the Flanders theatre than the others, but with Italy and Spain he really had to let go other than reminding commanders to stay within the overall broad strategic parameters. But to say he had no command experience is simply wrong: he commanded actively on campaign and directed sieges actively; he merely did not command a field army in battle. And were he and Lincoln really of different temperaments? Both men seem to me to be able to maintain considerable composure and calmness - at least in public - when under pressure.
Technically, Lincoln commanded troops in the field too (at Norfolk), but I wouldn’t class that as true field experience. What sort of command did Louis actually exercise? I was always under the impression that it was about the same as his successor in the 1740s.
Re micro-managing: my point was really about those strategic parameters than the operational-level details - even in Germany and Italy, they were often far stricter than his marshals would have liked.
Thanks for the response to my response. Louis XIV very much directed his field armies when on campaign with them - it was not like Louis XV deferring to Saxe. But of course Louis XIV listened to those marshals he were with him, and discussed things with them - and with his brother Philippe and his Conde cousin when they were there too. There was more deference in 1667-68, but by the Dutch War he is firmly in the decision-making seat when he is on campaign. I see Louis XIV as more than just a chair of councils of war, but as an executive head when on campaign - but he was extremely conscious that monarchs took advice and only tyrants did not. Glad you have picked up on the difference between operational level leeway and setting the strategic direction - the operational interference was greatest in Flanders, then Germany; and then it drops off considerably for Northern Italy and Catalonia/Spain, and after 1703 in Spain he more or less has to abdicate control over strategy to a tandem of Felipe V's government and his own commander in Iberia. If interested beyond this, do look at Jean-Philippe Cenat's Le roi stratege monograph.
Very interesting, thank you - I will take a look at Cenat and your own bibliography too.
A really good book of case studies on the how current and previous polities approaches this challenge is “The Making of Strategy” by Williamson, Knox, Bernstein.