Airlifting artillery forward also raises the question of sustainment and ammunition - do you have enough airlift and/or can you keep it safe long enough to deliver enough ammunition to make a difference?
Yeah, the artillery raids of the Gulf War were strictly tactical, on deck for as short as possible. Operational-level assaults would be a whole different beast.
More on the level of "get some boys and a battery up on that hill and stay there a bit until the guys on the ground catch up" in the vein of the Soviets in Afghanistan? That seems more doable.
I wonder if there's enough lift capacity to do things operationally without fixed-wing parachute pallets. My fond memories of Ride of the Valkyries from Apocalypse Now say "yes", but my mind says "you're gonna need a bigger air bridge".
More like setting up an entire firebase, probably offset from the main axes of advance. Would require HUGE lift, but it's possible - will go into in the next piece.
So when we would do brigade level air assaults we took 3x105 guns and under them was a ammo bag with maybe a dozen or more rounds. It was only to “kick in the door” and prep the LZ. Like I mentioned previously this is because American tactics were to land on the objective where the Russians would land away from it and try to sneak up. Once we secured the LZ the other 2 arty battery’s would come with all the support. After the first lift into an LZ the second lift included chinooks with all kinds of ammo and supplies. Usually including some higher level medical people.
The idea was to kick in the door and establish a secure LZ for follow on forces. Apaches and Kiowa warriors were always on hand for CAS and escort. We relied a lot on electronic counter measures for shoulder launched anti aircraft. Turns out it didn’t work well. Had a buddy taken down in Tikrit I’m 2003 by an SA18. Why they’d waste that on a Blackhawk has always perplexed me.
The 101st Airborne didn’t conduct any raids in Desert Storm. They sent the the division as a blocking force along with the 82nd ABN (by truck) and a French Division. At the time it was the largest and longest air mobile assault in history. I’m pretty sure that wasn’t considered a tactical move or a raid. Great article otherwise.
When the 101st Airborne conducted Brigade Assaults they usually involved the concept of an offset artillery battery of 105mm howitzers. Blackhawks could carry these with enough infantry to support the arty battery. This was placed in striking distance of the main LZ to prep for the Brigade assault. The TO&E of the 101st included an attack and assault battalion of helos and a company of chinooks along with a air Calvary troop. The chinooks were capable of lifting the gun trucks if the infantry brigades providing some motorized support with some bigger weapons such as TOW, MK-19 and .50 Cal machine guns.
The drawback for the Russians (I flew both blackhawks and Mi-17s) was that they didn’t really build the assault aircraft for rough landings or as we would say “to the x”. They were made to go from improved platform to improved platform really. But in designing them the Russians never really developed the doctrine behind what America would call an air assault. I will say though, those Russian helos were tough as nails compared to our Blackhawks. Like the difference between a dump truck and an F-150.
What's your impression of the Mi-26? It's impressive that they went to the effort to design a helicopter that could carry vehicles inside the frame, and they're supposed to be able to land on unprepared LZs, but haven't heard anything firsthand.
I think the Mi-26 was like our sky crane. Just too big and difficult to maintain. The Mi-8 and 17 are like a combo of a Blackhawk and a chinook. I went to the Ukraine for Mi17 school in 2009. All the instructors were retired Soviet army pilots (yes it was odd as a retired American army guy). They didn’t really build the Mi17 for what we would call “assault” operations. Our TTPs were built around flying light infantry to the target or the “x”. That’s why the offset artillery was an important concept. The Russians really didn’t train to the X. Not to say one is better, just different ways of getting killers behind enemy lines.
From what I understand, the Mi-24 was supposed to be the all-in-one assault/gunship. It was only when they resigned themselves to using it as a gunship with the D variant that they fell back on the Mi-8/17 for assault.
The only raid I remember prior to the ground war was the Apache battalion led by Dick Cody (retired 4star vice chief of staff). They took out lots of ADA radar.
1. The ground forces left on time instead of 2 hours later.
2. There’s more RU air support?
3. The IL-76 or other heavy reinforcement by air arrive earlier than 1900?
I realize part 2 addresses this with a hypothetical scenario, pardon this hypothetical based on what was available.
The entire point of discussing all this I humbly offer is getting around the stalemate IF the stalemate situation of defense and siege has returned... we don’t know yet if it has outside Ukraine. Ukraine may be a particular case. The Ukrainians began with no air, the Russians had to and still do husband their air assets against possible NATO intervention by air. The Ukrainians also have artillery inferiority and much of the terrain is open ground. The Russians could have overwhelmed them by force instead of slow attrition- but then would have left themselves weaker before NATO.
So the Ukrainian war conditions led to the result as much as new technology.
I suppose it's possible, although the Ukrainians shelled the tarmac once they realized they couldn't hold the airfield, so the Russians would have had to already been targeting Ukrainian artillery.
That's true enough about the specifics of airpower in the Ukraine war, but my contention is that it holds more generally. Outside of the US, there simply aren't many air forces that can operate against even a semi-capable IADS - that rules out most nations fighting a peer competitor in a conventional war.
I think there is a problem in general- probably- with breaking through the defense now in peer conflict and you and others deserve credit for trying to get a handle on it.
Ben I sent your write up to some retired general officers I know. All of them commanded in the 101st, two were brigade commanders and 2 had the entire division. Excellent job.
Airlifting artillery forward also raises the question of sustainment and ammunition - do you have enough airlift and/or can you keep it safe long enough to deliver enough ammunition to make a difference?
Yeah, the artillery raids of the Gulf War were strictly tactical, on deck for as short as possible. Operational-level assaults would be a whole different beast.
More on the level of "get some boys and a battery up on that hill and stay there a bit until the guys on the ground catch up" in the vein of the Soviets in Afghanistan? That seems more doable.
I wonder if there's enough lift capacity to do things operationally without fixed-wing parachute pallets. My fond memories of Ride of the Valkyries from Apocalypse Now say "yes", but my mind says "you're gonna need a bigger air bridge".
More like setting up an entire firebase, probably offset from the main axes of advance. Would require HUGE lift, but it's possible - will go into in the next piece.
So when we would do brigade level air assaults we took 3x105 guns and under them was a ammo bag with maybe a dozen or more rounds. It was only to “kick in the door” and prep the LZ. Like I mentioned previously this is because American tactics were to land on the objective where the Russians would land away from it and try to sneak up. Once we secured the LZ the other 2 arty battery’s would come with all the support. After the first lift into an LZ the second lift included chinooks with all kinds of ammo and supplies. Usually including some higher level medical people.
The idea was to kick in the door and establish a secure LZ for follow on forces. Apaches and Kiowa warriors were always on hand for CAS and escort. We relied a lot on electronic counter measures for shoulder launched anti aircraft. Turns out it didn’t work well. Had a buddy taken down in Tikrit I’m 2003 by an SA18. Why they’d waste that on a Blackhawk has always perplexed me.
The 101st Airborne didn’t conduct any raids in Desert Storm. They sent the the division as a blocking force along with the 82nd ABN (by truck) and a French Division. At the time it was the largest and longest air mobile assault in history. I’m pretty sure that wasn’t considered a tactical move or a raid. Great article otherwise.
When the 101st Airborne conducted Brigade Assaults they usually involved the concept of an offset artillery battery of 105mm howitzers. Blackhawks could carry these with enough infantry to support the arty battery. This was placed in striking distance of the main LZ to prep for the Brigade assault. The TO&E of the 101st included an attack and assault battalion of helos and a company of chinooks along with a air Calvary troop. The chinooks were capable of lifting the gun trucks if the infantry brigades providing some motorized support with some bigger weapons such as TOW, MK-19 and .50 Cal machine guns.
The drawback for the Russians (I flew both blackhawks and Mi-17s) was that they didn’t really build the assault aircraft for rough landings or as we would say “to the x”. They were made to go from improved platform to improved platform really. But in designing them the Russians never really developed the doctrine behind what America would call an air assault. I will say though, those Russian helos were tough as nails compared to our Blackhawks. Like the difference between a dump truck and an F-150.
What's your impression of the Mi-26? It's impressive that they went to the effort to design a helicopter that could carry vehicles inside the frame, and they're supposed to be able to land on unprepared LZs, but haven't heard anything firsthand.
I think the Mi-26 was like our sky crane. Just too big and difficult to maintain. The Mi-8 and 17 are like a combo of a Blackhawk and a chinook. I went to the Ukraine for Mi17 school in 2009. All the instructors were retired Soviet army pilots (yes it was odd as a retired American army guy). They didn’t really build the Mi17 for what we would call “assault” operations. Our TTPs were built around flying light infantry to the target or the “x”. That’s why the offset artillery was an important concept. The Russians really didn’t train to the X. Not to say one is better, just different ways of getting killers behind enemy lines.
From what I understand, the Mi-24 was supposed to be the all-in-one assault/gunship. It was only when they resigned themselves to using it as a gunship with the D variant that they fell back on the Mi-8/17 for assault.
You're right - the 101st did conduct pre-G-day raids into Iraq, but I edited it to emphasize its operational role in the ground campaign.
The only raid I remember prior to the ground war was the Apache battalion led by Dick Cody (retired 4star vice chief of staff). They took out lots of ADA radar.
This book covers it a bit, p. 198-99: https://www.google.com/books/edition/Certain_Victory/OvPUOWDCrSwC?hl=en
Late; would Hostumel have worked IF;
1. The ground forces left on time instead of 2 hours later.
2. There’s more RU air support?
3. The IL-76 or other heavy reinforcement by air arrive earlier than 1900?
I realize part 2 addresses this with a hypothetical scenario, pardon this hypothetical based on what was available.
The entire point of discussing all this I humbly offer is getting around the stalemate IF the stalemate situation of defense and siege has returned... we don’t know yet if it has outside Ukraine. Ukraine may be a particular case. The Ukrainians began with no air, the Russians had to and still do husband their air assets against possible NATO intervention by air. The Ukrainians also have artillery inferiority and much of the terrain is open ground. The Russians could have overwhelmed them by force instead of slow attrition- but then would have left themselves weaker before NATO.
So the Ukrainian war conditions led to the result as much as new technology.
I suppose it's possible, although the Ukrainians shelled the tarmac once they realized they couldn't hold the airfield, so the Russians would have had to already been targeting Ukrainian artillery.
That's true enough about the specifics of airpower in the Ukraine war, but my contention is that it holds more generally. Outside of the US, there simply aren't many air forces that can operate against even a semi-capable IADS - that rules out most nations fighting a peer competitor in a conventional war.
Thank you.
I think there is a problem in general- probably- with breaking through the defense now in peer conflict and you and others deserve credit for trying to get a handle on it.
Ben I sent your write up to some retired general officers I know. All of them commanded in the 101st, two were brigade commanders and 2 had the entire division. Excellent job.
Thank you, that's an honor! Would love to hear what they think.