Will counter-drone defense ever become effective enough that it becomes uneconomical to employ FPVs in mass quantities without any complementary effort?
With increased autonomy, and a few more loops around the measure-countermeasure cycle, I also expect we will see the development of UAS that serve an area air defense role. As the units themselves need better performance (physical or cognitive) to defeat tougher defenses, there will also be more of an incentive to disentangle the role of 'platform' from that of 'munition.'
Agree, I think we're already at the point where there's little practical difference between an advanced drone and a missile. Have you seen footage of quadcopter interceptors?
In the near future, most armored vehicles should be armed with short range are defense. It does not take much adaption to turn a current systems like CROWS into an air defense role. The newest Infantry Carrier Vehicle variants of the Dragoon Stryker have the ability to shoot a wall of flak at drones. Widely adopted radars and other means of target acquisition between vehicles will mean small-UAS has an incredibly short life span on the battlefield (even less of a life span than drones currently have in Ukraine). They will continue to play a critical role as expendable reconnaissance assets for decision-making and artillery targeting, but the FPV suicide drone will play a diminishing role.
A layered defense is the best defense. Suspect we'll get to the point where escorts drones serve the function of reactive armor, giving VICS/PAX a bit of standoff.
Feels like drones will remain a major factor, perhaps more in a passive observation mode like a flock of forward runners observers. Could they be outfitted as non-nuclear EMP platforms? That would change things for the worse.
I would have thought air/land drones wld hv a very useful, perhaps even central, role in future integrated mine clearing operations. Both detection and detonation.
I think we are going to see large scale netting deployed for visual and thermal concealment. Different from the giant camouflage netting they used to conceal stuff like a whole Boeing factory in WWII: visual sensors and ML over historical imagery will make it hard to conceal existence. Idea will be to conceal value of the assets inside and where within the large tented area they are located.
May be more effective for missiles than agile drones since you could use one to punch a hole with subsequent ones entering and identifying targets. IDK why they haven't already done this with airbases within Iranian missile range.
Drone netting will certainly be a necessity in all cases, but camouflage only really works to slow the targeting cycle against mobile forces - fixed facilities are just too easy to collect on. Hardening, which in practical terms means burying, is the only viable form of protection against missiles.
Also, if you actually enforce signals discipline and don't have human leaks at a fixed facility, collection is basically limited to high altitude imagery that is generally not persistent?
Even if it was fully persistent, could tent the roads between the tents or the entire facility. I wonder if part of the reason this hasn't been done is potential for destabilizing IR effects? Like when Ukraine targeted the Russian strategic bombers, they were parked in the open as part of nuclear treaty compliance.
Hardened shelters are expensive and time consuming to build. Missiles are expensive and limited in number. Long range drones have small blast radius. Fabric for visual concealment and poles are cheap. You could build a bunch of football field sized tents disbursed across enough area that you need one missile per tent, and you don't know if there is expensive mobile asset inside to make it worth it.
Like USAF strategy in pacific is to disburse air assets across smaller fixed bases, keep them moving between, I don't think there are trying to build hardened shelters at all of them. Seems like adding visual concealment to large parts the potential bases would make it more effective.
It's just not possible to hide an airfield these days. Emissions control alone is extremely hard and there are too many other means of detection besides - like just paying local informants. This is especially true in the western Pacific, where there isn't very much suitable land in the first place. Ballistic missiles and hardening are both pretty cheap compared to the value of functional airfields in a hot conflict.
With increased autonomy, and a few more loops around the measure-countermeasure cycle, I also expect we will see the development of UAS that serve an area air defense role. As the units themselves need better performance (physical or cognitive) to defeat tougher defenses, there will also be more of an incentive to disentangle the role of 'platform' from that of 'munition.'
Agree, I think we're already at the point where there's little practical difference between an advanced drone and a missile. Have you seen footage of quadcopter interceptors?
In the near future, most armored vehicles should be armed with short range are defense. It does not take much adaption to turn a current systems like CROWS into an air defense role. The newest Infantry Carrier Vehicle variants of the Dragoon Stryker have the ability to shoot a wall of flak at drones. Widely adopted radars and other means of target acquisition between vehicles will mean small-UAS has an incredibly short life span on the battlefield (even less of a life span than drones currently have in Ukraine). They will continue to play a critical role as expendable reconnaissance assets for decision-making and artillery targeting, but the FPV suicide drone will play a diminishing role.
A layered defense is the best defense. Suspect we'll get to the point where escorts drones serve the function of reactive armor, giving VICS/PAX a bit of standoff.
Feels like drones will remain a major factor, perhaps more in a passive observation mode like a flock of forward runners observers. Could they be outfitted as non-nuclear EMP platforms? That would change things for the worse.
Probably too small for that, but lots else they can do as you point out.
I would have thought air/land drones wld hv a very useful, perhaps even central, role in future integrated mine clearing operations. Both detection and detonation.
I think we are going to see large scale netting deployed for visual and thermal concealment. Different from the giant camouflage netting they used to conceal stuff like a whole Boeing factory in WWII: visual sensors and ML over historical imagery will make it hard to conceal existence. Idea will be to conceal value of the assets inside and where within the large tented area they are located.
May be more effective for missiles than agile drones since you could use one to punch a hole with subsequent ones entering and identifying targets. IDK why they haven't already done this with airbases within Iranian missile range.
Drone netting will certainly be a necessity in all cases, but camouflage only really works to slow the targeting cycle against mobile forces - fixed facilities are just too easy to collect on. Hardening, which in practical terms means burying, is the only viable form of protection against missiles.
Also, if you actually enforce signals discipline and don't have human leaks at a fixed facility, collection is basically limited to high altitude imagery that is generally not persistent?
Even if it was fully persistent, could tent the roads between the tents or the entire facility. I wonder if part of the reason this hasn't been done is potential for destabilizing IR effects? Like when Ukraine targeted the Russian strategic bombers, they were parked in the open as part of nuclear treaty compliance.
Hardened shelters are expensive and time consuming to build. Missiles are expensive and limited in number. Long range drones have small blast radius. Fabric for visual concealment and poles are cheap. You could build a bunch of football field sized tents disbursed across enough area that you need one missile per tent, and you don't know if there is expensive mobile asset inside to make it worth it.
Like USAF strategy in pacific is to disburse air assets across smaller fixed bases, keep them moving between, I don't think there are trying to build hardened shelters at all of them. Seems like adding visual concealment to large parts the potential bases would make it more effective.
It's just not possible to hide an airfield these days. Emissions control alone is extremely hard and there are too many other means of detection besides - like just paying local informants. This is especially true in the western Pacific, where there isn't very much suitable land in the first place. Ballistic missiles and hardening are both pretty cheap compared to the value of functional airfields in a hot conflict.