Grand Strategy on the Political Stage: America in the War of 1812
Between 1812 and 1814, a coalition slowly mobilized to defeat Napoleon. It began with Russia fighting alone against the French invasion, supported by British subsidies and operations in Spain. Sweden and Prussia joined soon after, followed by Austria and a slew of smaller states. In just under two years, the Sixth Coalition drove the Grande Armée across Europe and toppled Napoleon from the throne of France.
This was no easy proposition. Napoleon had slipped the noose many times before to triumph against impossible odds. If he managed to knock a few participants out the war, would others not defect from the coalition as they had in the past? Would those few remaining not be left to face his full wrath alone? And yet this never happened: the allies maintained their unity to the end through all setbacks. For such a large and disparate coalition, it was a supreme triumph of strategy and grand strategy.
During that same period, one of the coalition members was embroiled in an altogether more haphazard endeavor. The War of 1812 was just one of many scattered conflicts that Britain fought during the Napoleonic Wars. The Continental System—Napoleon’s attempt to strangle British commerce—brought her into direct conflict with Sweden, Turkey, and, as late as the summer of 1812, with Russia itself. The Royal Navy’s actions on the high seas also raised tensions with the United States, which on 18 June 1812—just 6 days before Napoleon crossed the Niemen into Russia—declared war.
Against the looming danger of French hegemony, the North American war was more a problem to be managed than an outright crisis. Britain needed to protect her Canadian possessions and maintain maritime supremacy, but had to defer a more thorough response until a more opportune time. On the American side, the matter was decidedly more complicated. The stated cause of the war was British trade restrictions and the impressment of American sailors, but these issues existed against a wider backdrop: westward expansion, hostile Indian tribes, and the fate of Canada, all of which raised complicated political questions.
Politics and War
The two meanings of the word “politics” often get conflated when speaking of warfare. Clausewitz’ definition of war as “politics by other means” usually refers to statecraft—or simply policy—and not the domestic politics of elections, favor-trading, and wrangling constituencies. (The conduct of war often is influenced by domestic concerns, although that represents unwelcome interference to those responsible for its conduct.)
Grand strategy is somewhat different. If strategy is the means to grand strategic ends, who gets to define those ends? Any government must show that it is supporting the good of the nation in order to maintain legitimacy, and therefore that its policy abroad is beneficial to different constituencies. Which wars to fight, which trade policies to enact, which great projects to undertake abroad—all these decisions represent compromises among various domestic interests. Grand strategy is ultimately a product of the domestic political process, however indirectly.
Viewed through this lens, the Sixth Coalition’s grand strategy was in fact quite simple. Everyone agreed that Napoleon must go: his wars disrupted the merchant’s commerce, confiscated the peasant’s surplus, dismembered monarchs’ inheritances, stirred up popular discontent against the aristocracy, and killed countless sons. Absolute monarchs and commercial republics alike could trust that others would stick it through to the end; the only real debate was how to get rid of him, a purely military question that was managed without too much difficulty.
American grand strategy, by contrast, was far more complicated. Policy-makers did not have to contend with the singular a threat of Napoleon, but with a tangle of conflicting domestic interests. The War of 1812 was fought under the banner of “Free Trade and Sailors’ Rights”—a reference to British trade restrictions and the impressment of American sailors—but many other issues were at play that expanded its scope and objectives. At the same time, America’s limited means severely its freedom of action. President James Madison’s administration was ill-prepared for war, lacking a military machine or capable deputies. It was also politically weak, unable to rein in the fractious forces of his own party.
The War of 1812 serves as an interesting study of the relationship between strategy and grand strategy precisely because of these difficulties. It presents a striking contrast to American grand strategy in the Cold War, which was dominated by a singular overriding threat, or the relatively unconstrained adventures of the post-Cold War era. And seen in the broadest context, it gives lie to the idea that grand strategy is something that can be formulated in a policy document. It is, to adapt Moltke’s phrase, a system of expediencies, subject to internal and external pressures.
A Long Road to War
The outbreak of hostilities was not precipitated by any acute crisis, but rather a steady worsening of relations over nearly a decade. The most prominent issue was impressment. The Napoleonic Wars created a huge demand for manpower in the Royal Navy, and beginning in 1803 warships often boarded neutral vessels to press-gang British subjects serving in the crew. This often left ships undermanned—as many as 30% of American sailors were British—and occasionally swept up American citizens by mistake. One particular incident in 1807 made this issue stick in the public’s mind. A British warship set upon an American frigate, the USS Chesapeake, off Norfolk. After several broadsides killed or wounded nineteen crewmembers, a boarding party hauled off four deserters. Three of these had gained American citizenship and were eventually released in 1811, but the protracted dispute left public opinion embittered.
Although not as sensational as impressment, British commercial policy was another major point of contention. After Britain imposed a blockade on all Channel and North Sea ports in 1806, Napoleon implemented his Continental System: all neutral ships which had visited a British port were barred from French-controlled ports, and any neutrals carrying British goods were valid targets for privateers. Britain retaliated the following year with a decree that any neutral vessel heading to a port from which her own vessels were excluded must first stop in Britain and pay transit fees. Napoleon riposted with a declaration that any vessel submitting to British restrictions was subject to seizure.
The escalating trade war between Britain and France put American commerce in an impossible situation. Although the mutual blockade could never be fully enforced, over 900 American ships were seized by both belligerents between 1807 and 1812. The United States Congress responded in late 1807 with a comprehensive embargo act, which barred most American ships from leaving home waters and banned imports from abroad. This hurt the domestic economy more than it hurt its intended targets, so in March 1809 it was lifted for all countries except Britain and France.
Thus far, both parties to the European conflict were viewed with suspicion on the other side of the Atlantic. But for the Chesapeake affair, Americans probably would have viewed France in a worse light—the two countries had recently fought the Quasi-War (1798-1800) over French privateering. What tipped the balance was an attempt by Congress to fully reopen trade. In 1810, it passed a bill that unilaterally lifted all trade restrictions, but would reimpose them on whichever country refused to honor the United States’ rights as neutrals. Neither country intended to respect this neutrality, but the French said they would and released several captive ships as a show of good faith; Britain was unmoved, and the US reimposed restrictions solely on her in early 1811.
The Indian Question
A third major issue was British policy along the northwestern frontier. The Northwest Territory—lands east of the Mississippi, north of the Ohio rivers, and south of the Great Lakes which were not yet incorporated as states—was ceded by Britain after the Revolution, but remained occupied by Indian tribes. A series of wars, treaties, and purchases in the following decades opened much of this up to white settlement, leading to the admission of Ohio as a state and the reorganization of the rest into smaller Territories.
This rapid expansion sparked more organized resistance, led by the Shawnee chief Tecumseh and his brother, the prophet Tenskwatawa, who preached a return to the old ways and the expulsion of the white man. Tecumseh was the Moses to his brother’s Aaron, and built a large confederacy of Indian tribes throughout the old Northwest Territory and Canada. He also began importing weapons from Canada, leading many Americans to suspect British involvement behind Indian resistance.
Although violence was limited to isolated killings, the governor of the Indiana Territory, future president William Henry Harrison, suspected Tecumseh was preparing a full-scale war. In the autumn of 1811, he led an expedition to Tenskwatawa’s head village to seek satisfaction for the killings. After a tense meeting, some of the Indians attacked the Americans (Tecumseh was not present). Harrison’s men won the ensuing Battle of Tippecanoe, then torched the settlement. Although this did not yet lead to open warfare, Indian killings of settlers increased. Tecumseh meanwhile continued his recruiting drive and actively sought a British alliance.
The War Constituencies
News of Tippecanoe amplified emotions in Washington, where Congress had already convened to discuss the possibility of war with the British. Opinion was divided along partisan lines. The Democratic-Republicans held the commanding heights of American politics, controlling 30 of 34 Senate seats and 94 of 142 House seats. Their Federalist opponents had steadily lost ground since 1800, when they lost the presidency and saw their Congressional majorities eroded, losing both chambers just two years later.
The so-called War Hawks among the Republicans argued for war in defense of national honor. Their language sounds archaic, but it expressed genuine strategic concerns: the British used ongoing hostilities with Napoleon to justify interference with neutral shipping, but the Hawks feared that this set a precedent which would endure in peacetime—some even framed their struggle as a second War of Independence. Their Federalist opponents drew the opposite conclusion from the same evidence, predicting an eventual return to normalcy.
Party politics masked the true divide, which was regional. Support for the war was strongest in the South and in the West. Southern states were major agricultural exporters which suffered from the British trade restrictions, and appeals to national honor were strongest there. The Western states were most interested in territorial expansion, and were angered by the alleged cooperation the British had already given to Tecumseh. They saw in the war an opportunity to defeat the Indians and continue their westward drive.
Opinion was far more circumspect in the Mid-Atlantic states. These were more reliant on commerce, which would be hurt by the war itself (although some isolated spots, notably Baltimore, were hotbeds of war fever, and outside of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was more aligned with the Western states). The war would prove lucrative to the economies of New York and Pennsylvania especially, but that would not become apparent until much later.
The Northeast was the great outlier. New Englanders and upstate New Yorkers had been the most eager to invade Canada in the Revolution and colonial wars with France, yet were the most opposed to war in 1812. Commerce played a disproportionate role in their economy, and war was bound to disrupt it—they had already been hit hard by the trade war. Canada was moreover an important market for their goods, and their fishermen depended on the waters off Nova Scotia, access to which had been guaranteed by the treaty ending the Revolutionary War. The Federalist Party served as a vehicle for Yankee opposition—it was practically a regional platform by this point—but party ideology also gave them practical grounds for their position: as advocates of a strong federal government, they were keenly aware of just how unprepared America was for war.
Other factions existed within the Republican Party itself, which was too large to be a monolith. These opposed—or at least moderated—the War Hawks, albeit for very different reasons which largely followed regional divisions. The Old Republicans were Southerners who stood for Jeffersonian agrarian principles, fearing the intrusions on states’ rights and the expansion of federal power that war would bring. The Clintonians, by contrast, were mostly Northern Republicans who agreed with the Federalists on many issues, most notably on the issue of protecting trade. A third faction, represented by a diffuse group of senators from the Mid-Atlantic states, was called by later historians as the “Invisibles”: they were pro-war, but their advocacy of more vigorous federal spending ran counter to the small-government ideology of their party.
Declaration of War
Attempting to wrangle these different factions toward a common end was President James Madison. He had come to office in 1809 just three days after the strict embargo was lifted, and spent the following three years fruitlessly trying to settle the ongoing dispute. He was seen as a weak leader and despised by many within his own party, leaving him unable to steer policy firmly in one direction or another; by fits and starts, opinion in Congress lurched towards belligerence.
The British perceived the danger of a rudderless drift toward war, and attempted to calm tensions. In late 1811 they returned the surviving detainees from the Chesapeake and paid an indemnity. The following spring their squadrons in the western Atlantic were instructed to adopt a more tactful approach toward American crews and to avoid American waters. Later that spring, the government offered to give American vessels equal share in the license trade—authorized exemptions to the blockade of the European continent.
None of these measures had their intended effect. The settlement of the Chesapeake affair after so many years only aroused a bitter taste, while the new policy toward American shipping was not sufficiently advertised to affect public opinion; in light of the previous acrimony, the prospect of sharing in British licenses appeared an act of submission. One final measure had the potential to avert war, however. Prime Minister Spencer Percival, who had supported a hardline trade policy, was assassinated on 11 May (for unrelated reasons). His successor, Lord Liverpool, adopted a more conciliatory policy which reflected the changing mood in London, and on 16 June it was announced that all trade restrictions would be dropped if the United States reciprocated by ending its ban on British imports.
This proved too late. Americans had been hoping for such a concession throughout the spring; when news reached Washington in May that the restrictions would not be lifted, and that the British were not signaling any willingness to do so, Madison delivered a speech to Congress recommending war. After considerable debate in the Senate over the scope of the intended conflict, a declaration of war was passed on 17 June. Voting largely followed regional lines, with the Federalists unanimous in their opposition and some Republicans crossing over, bringing the total to 79-49 in the House and 19-13 in the Senate—the narrowest margin for war in American history. The following day—two days after British trade restrictions were lifted and eight weeks before the news reached Washington—Madison signed the bill.
Ends and Means in Canada
The greatest issue looming over war planning was Canada. Congress had considered limiting hostilities to the high seas, following the precedent of the successful Quasi-War, but Canada presented too great an opportunity. Land campaigns ran better odds of success than campaigns at sea, where the Royal Navy reigned supreme, and Canada was the one theater that could be accessed by land; by simple syllogism, Canada should be attacked. The object was agreed upon, but what about the purpose?
Figures close to the administration were foremost concerned with gaining leverage to obtain their stated war aims: Canada could be exchanged for concessions on maritime matters. But there was a sizable constituency that saw it as an end in itself, both to eject the British from North America and to fulfill America’s continental destiny. Until the conquest was made reality, however, this question could be deferred.
Beyond the question of why Canada should be invaded, there was the question of how. The Great Lakes occupied a large part of the border, leaving only a few areas where an army could easily cross. From west to east, these were the Detroit River, the Niagara River, and the long northern border of New York and New England. Canada’s sole lifeline to the outside world was the St. Lawrence River, so an invasion directed at Montreal made the most sense.
Things were not so simple, however. The eastern route passed through a difficult wilderness, and depended on supplies and manpower from a region hostile to the enterprise. The frontiersmen of the northwest were far more enthusiastic, driven as they were by a desire for conquest and suspicions over British designs. Madison acquiesced in funding offensives along all three fronts, even though the more westerly ones offered the least strategic benefit (and would ultimately consume the most resources). The realities of the grand strategic landscape dictated suboptimal strategic planning.
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