The Revolt of the Public is his easy packaging of his ideas. First chapter is tepid human interest but everything else is simple and obvious theories that put names on stuff you've definitely noticed but may have never foregrounded.
Otherwise you'd have to read his blog archive, which I've found unfruitful
An important difference between unlimited/total wars fought to the finish and limited/cabinet wars is that national passions are fully committed in the former but not in the latter. This has decisive implications for the balance of resolve, conditioning how far each side can go. This problem especially plagues imperialist and counterinsurgency wars, where national passions are not fully committed in the imperial power but are on the receiving end. This then generates the otherwise spectacular pattern of the weaker side defeating the stronger (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran).
And looking at it from the other end, it's pretty striking how wars fought to the finish almost always see a string of continuous successes from the midpoint on. Reverses late in the war that are serious enough to put the outcome in doubt make it difficult to sustain even popular wars.
To address the conceptual confusion of attrition, I have found it valuable to discuss attrition versus maneuver as operational approaches, while using exhaustion versus annihilation as strategic approaches. Each approach has a logic based.
I feel the later better approximates Delbruk’s and Svechin’s usage. By using exhaustion, it adds a sense of political will, and fits with a broad employment of the tools of national power to wear down an enemy’s will to continue a war. Whereas annihilation is the strategy of consolidating power at a single point for a decisive victory, often the defeat of the enemy’s primary field army.
At the operational level, attrition degrades an enemy force, normally relying on synchronization and efficient, tactical victories. Whereas, maneuver exploit’s vulnerabilities, surprise, and tempo to cause a collapse of an enemy’s systems (logistics, C2, fires, etc.,) producing a more dramatic victory, but it is risky and context dependent.
Useful distinction between the strategic and lower levels, both political will and the essentially strategic nature of force generation make the former categorically different from lower-level attrition.
I do think we get trapped by Clausewitz' annihilation label. His point is clear enough in context, but using it as a shorthand focuses too much attention on the material aspects, especially in an age where strategically-decisive events are far less singular. It's interesting how that tension appears in Svechin, where he clearly senses the trend of rolling operations that exhaust the enemy, but speaks of destruction as something uniquely decisive.
Much needed definition and discussion. Thank you for an excellent read 👍
>defeat is psychological
I recommend Martin Gurri's discussion of the information sphere: the public doesn't act like a person "only moreso" but has its own rules
Any particular works?
The Revolt of the Public is his easy packaging of his ideas. First chapter is tepid human interest but everything else is simple and obvious theories that put names on stuff you've definitely noticed but may have never foregrounded.
Otherwise you'd have to read his blog archive, which I've found unfruitful
An important difference between unlimited/total wars fought to the finish and limited/cabinet wars is that national passions are fully committed in the former but not in the latter. This has decisive implications for the balance of resolve, conditioning how far each side can go. This problem especially plagues imperialist and counterinsurgency wars, where national passions are not fully committed in the imperial power but are on the receiving end. This then generates the otherwise spectacular pattern of the weaker side defeating the stronger (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iran).
And looking at it from the other end, it's pretty striking how wars fought to the finish almost always see a string of continuous successes from the midpoint on. Reverses late in the war that are serious enough to put the outcome in doubt make it difficult to sustain even popular wars.
To address the conceptual confusion of attrition, I have found it valuable to discuss attrition versus maneuver as operational approaches, while using exhaustion versus annihilation as strategic approaches. Each approach has a logic based.
I feel the later better approximates Delbruk’s and Svechin’s usage. By using exhaustion, it adds a sense of political will, and fits with a broad employment of the tools of national power to wear down an enemy’s will to continue a war. Whereas annihilation is the strategy of consolidating power at a single point for a decisive victory, often the defeat of the enemy’s primary field army.
At the operational level, attrition degrades an enemy force, normally relying on synchronization and efficient, tactical victories. Whereas, maneuver exploit’s vulnerabilities, surprise, and tempo to cause a collapse of an enemy’s systems (logistics, C2, fires, etc.,) producing a more dramatic victory, but it is risky and context dependent.
Useful distinction between the strategic and lower levels, both political will and the essentially strategic nature of force generation make the former categorically different from lower-level attrition.
I do think we get trapped by Clausewitz' annihilation label. His point is clear enough in context, but using it as a shorthand focuses too much attention on the material aspects, especially in an age where strategically-decisive events are far less singular. It's interesting how that tension appears in Svechin, where he clearly senses the trend of rolling operations that exhaust the enemy, but speaks of destruction as something uniquely decisive.