Yes this doctrine looks suspiciously like “yeah but we would succeed where they failed” backseat quarterbacking. There are so many brittle assumptions in their 4-division 4-phase model. And if any assumption breaks you have the wrong units in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong equipment, wrong training and wrong doctrine.
Exactly that - plus 1940 France just isn't a very good template for an offensive model in the first place. Unfortunately, the assumptions embedded in some real-life units (*cough* MLRs) are even worse.
We’re short materials and logistics officers, over strength and overstaffed combat arms … and prithee over theories-d and over PPT and over published;
solution: put down the lyre of Apollo and pick up the hammer and anvil of Vulcan. In plain words go into logistics AND industry - industry is also short people. If you want to remain in uniform get 3D printers aka Additive Manufacturing to print all those motors and other short parts, or manufacture drones at your level. DLA has approved libraries for additive manufacturing parts (3D printing) and the drones are now munitions and resources pushed along with approval to unit level- other units already doing same in Italy (173d).
Having spent significant time assigned to MEUs—both the Command Element and the Ground Combat Element—I couldn’t help but think about the MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) throughout this article. I’m sure my appreciation for the MAGTF is shaped by several personal biases, especially its flexibility in scaling and task organization to fit different mission profiles. But in my view, it’s a hard concept to beat
Agreed - organized around the problems of operating amphibiously, not optimized for a specific task (e.g. contested landing, humanitarian assistance, etc.). Gives the commander the tools he needs, then lets him figure out the rest.
I agree that the MAGTF is the best modern example of the right way to organize and is essentially the antithesis of the very rigid, scripted approach expressed in the article. Having experienced the challenges of coordinating combined arms efforts on the Army side I can say I always envied the Marines ability to conduct combined arms coordination and operations seamlessly thanks to the MAGTF structure. We must fight as a combined arms team. Why not organize that way in the first place?
Great article and thank you for posting. I think your insights are spot on. From my perspective, this sort of highly-scripted, synchronization focused concept is something that many militaries have courted over the years, but it always breaks down when confronted with the chaos of real battle. Some examples include French pre-war conceptions of "Methodical Battle" or Ahmad Ismail Ali's highly scripted offensive in the 1973 Arab-Isreali war. The latter example actually worked out surprisingly well until the Egyptians ran out of script. Scripts just don't work against a living, thinking opponent who knows how to adapt to battlefield changes.
The force that seems to have the best grasp on synchronized, multi-echelon attacks was the Soviets. However, as the article points out these were heavily dependent on overwhelming firepower. I would also argue that they still weren't that effective and only worked once the Wehrmacht was debilitatingly weakened; though some historians like David Glantz make convincing arguments to the contrary so I can't claim to be entirely sure on that point. Regardless, I believe the historical evidence is clear: scripted, synchronized attacks rarely (if ever) work. Disappointing that modern military thinkers are barking up that tree again.
The key point in my opinion is that if your plan is designed so it can only work ONE WAY, then an intelligent enemy knows exactly what to expect and will surely find a way to counter. Great article once again. I look forward to more from The Bazaar!
Agree - think there's also a distinction between command structures that are bound to scripts and entire militaries. WW2 French and arguably Soviets were the former, whereas the Egyptians are probably the latter. The 3rd Army in 1973 was flexible enough to launch a flank attack against the Israeli bridging attempt, but lacked the capability to pull it off on the fly.
Very interesting and valid points about identifying at what level or in what capacity the "scripting" takes hold. I would love to hear more of your insights on that. Perhaps that might be an interesting topic for a follow-up article.
You make good points about the 1973 war as well. I would say that the inability of Egyptians to effectively counter is likely the result of the over-reliance on scripted training. I have long believed that the better you get at scripted operations the worse you get at mission command and adaptability. The inverse principle applies as well and it is hard to be good at both simultaneously.
Thank you again for the outstanding article and additional insights!
"quarterbacking" is dead right. this plan works fine if you can swap the entire team between each play, football fashion. if the opposition is playing some other game, or if there are practical constraints on the swap, it won't.
Now consider the new RUSI study report from Ukraine:
Yes this doctrine looks suspiciously like “yeah but we would succeed where they failed” backseat quarterbacking. There are so many brittle assumptions in their 4-division 4-phase model. And if any assumption breaks you have the wrong units in the wrong place at the wrong time with the wrong equipment, wrong training and wrong doctrine.
Exactly that - plus 1940 France just isn't a very good template for an offensive model in the first place. Unfortunately, the assumptions embedded in some real-life units (*cough* MLRs) are even worse.
We’re short materials and logistics officers, over strength and overstaffed combat arms … and prithee over theories-d and over PPT and over published;
solution: put down the lyre of Apollo and pick up the hammer and anvil of Vulcan. In plain words go into logistics AND industry - industry is also short people. If you want to remain in uniform get 3D printers aka Additive Manufacturing to print all those motors and other short parts, or manufacture drones at your level. DLA has approved libraries for additive manufacturing parts (3D printing) and the drones are now munitions and resources pushed along with approval to unit level- other units already doing same in Italy (173d).
>Think of what a Bullet on the x_ER that makes<
If you can’t fight, BUILD IT until you can…
Link to DLA additive manufacturing below. ⬇️
Interesting. "If you can't fight, build it until you can." Agree with additive manufacturing. Read your linked DLA. Hmm.
https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/InformationOperations/Research%20and%20Development/DLA%20Additive%20Manufacturing%20Implementation%20Plan_01Jun2022.pdf?ver=iONnPBInAnUuL-hTi6dyQQ%3D%3D&utm_source=chatgpt.com
Having spent significant time assigned to MEUs—both the Command Element and the Ground Combat Element—I couldn’t help but think about the MAGTF (Marine Air-Ground Task Force) throughout this article. I’m sure my appreciation for the MAGTF is shaped by several personal biases, especially its flexibility in scaling and task organization to fit different mission profiles. But in my view, it’s a hard concept to beat
Agreed - organized around the problems of operating amphibiously, not optimized for a specific task (e.g. contested landing, humanitarian assistance, etc.). Gives the commander the tools he needs, then lets him figure out the rest.
I agree that the MAGTF is the best modern example of the right way to organize and is essentially the antithesis of the very rigid, scripted approach expressed in the article. Having experienced the challenges of coordinating combined arms efforts on the Army side I can say I always envied the Marines ability to conduct combined arms coordination and operations seamlessly thanks to the MAGTF structure. We must fight as a combined arms team. Why not organize that way in the first place?
Great article and thank you for posting. I think your insights are spot on. From my perspective, this sort of highly-scripted, synchronization focused concept is something that many militaries have courted over the years, but it always breaks down when confronted with the chaos of real battle. Some examples include French pre-war conceptions of "Methodical Battle" or Ahmad Ismail Ali's highly scripted offensive in the 1973 Arab-Isreali war. The latter example actually worked out surprisingly well until the Egyptians ran out of script. Scripts just don't work against a living, thinking opponent who knows how to adapt to battlefield changes.
The force that seems to have the best grasp on synchronized, multi-echelon attacks was the Soviets. However, as the article points out these were heavily dependent on overwhelming firepower. I would also argue that they still weren't that effective and only worked once the Wehrmacht was debilitatingly weakened; though some historians like David Glantz make convincing arguments to the contrary so I can't claim to be entirely sure on that point. Regardless, I believe the historical evidence is clear: scripted, synchronized attacks rarely (if ever) work. Disappointing that modern military thinkers are barking up that tree again.
The key point in my opinion is that if your plan is designed so it can only work ONE WAY, then an intelligent enemy knows exactly what to expect and will surely find a way to counter. Great article once again. I look forward to more from The Bazaar!
Agree - think there's also a distinction between command structures that are bound to scripts and entire militaries. WW2 French and arguably Soviets were the former, whereas the Egyptians are probably the latter. The 3rd Army in 1973 was flexible enough to launch a flank attack against the Israeli bridging attempt, but lacked the capability to pull it off on the fly.
Very interesting and valid points about identifying at what level or in what capacity the "scripting" takes hold. I would love to hear more of your insights on that. Perhaps that might be an interesting topic for a follow-up article.
You make good points about the 1973 war as well. I would say that the inability of Egyptians to effectively counter is likely the result of the over-reliance on scripted training. I have long believed that the better you get at scripted operations the worse you get at mission command and adaptability. The inverse principle applies as well and it is hard to be good at both simultaneously.
Thank you again for the outstanding article and additional insights!
Finally relived to find other defence enthusiast
"quarterbacking" is dead right. this plan works fine if you can swap the entire team between each play, football fashion. if the opposition is playing some other game, or if there are practical constraints on the swap, it won't.
Now consider the new RUSI study report from Ukraine:
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/emergent-approaches-combined-arms-manoeuvre-ukraine
it really doesn't sound like there's much chance of pulling the swap off!