Yet the Greeks are accustomed to wage wars, as I learn, and they do it most senselessly in their wrongheadedness and folly. When they have declared war against each other, they come down to the fairest and most level ground that they can find and fight there, so that the victors come off with great harm; of the vanquished I say not so much as a word, for they are utterly destroyed. Since they speak the same language, they should end their disputes by means of heralds or messengers, or by any way rather than fighting; if they must make war upon each other, they should each discover where they are in the strongest position and make the attempt there.
Dien Bien Phu once again proves you want ground artillery and not primarily air artillery, a lesson we the West and America can’t learn.
That’s not saying “no air, no CAS” it’s you must have ground artillery superiority or at least parity and not rely on air support, never mind air supply. Cannons aren’t sexy but they work in any weather. Mortars aren’t high tech but in the Army now it’s the first question we salts ask “you’re taking the mortars, right?”
The USMC are about to learn this lesson about organic artillery and armor again, and no “high tech rockets” aren’t the same. In WW2 there were early assaults in the Pacific and by the Army as well where they didn’t take enough artillery, cuz like Air. Costly.
Not having gone too far down the FD 2030 rabbit hole, that aspect was always what made me most uneasy. Structuring the force around a particular mission set, rather than starting with the basics and building from there, seems very limiting.
Understandable in context of being forced to choose, from what I have read of FD30 they aren’t going overboard on anything and are keeping tubes, they got rid of tanks as the USMC wasn’t using them- too heavy to deploy practically and didn’t use over 2-3 decades.
The sea lift capacity issues or lack thereof are more troubling-
Dien Bien Phu once again proves you want ground artillery and not primarily air artillery, a lesson we the West and America can’t learn.
That’s not saying “no air, no CAS” it’s you must have ground artillery superiority or at least parity and not rely on air support, never mind air supply. Cannons aren’t sexy but they work in any weather. Mortars aren’t high tech but in the Army now it’s the first question we salts ask “you’re taking the mortars, right?”
The USMC are about to learn this lesson about organic artillery and armor again, and no “high tech rockets” aren’t the same. In WW2 there were early assaults in the Pacific and by the Army as well where they didn’t take enough artillery, cuz like Air. Costly.
Not having gone too far down the FD 2030 rabbit hole, that aspect was always what made me most uneasy. Structuring the force around a particular mission set, rather than starting with the basics and building from there, seems very limiting.
Understandable in context of being forced to choose, from what I have read of FD30 they aren’t going overboard on anything and are keeping tubes, they got rid of tanks as the USMC wasn’t using them- too heavy to deploy practically and didn’t use over 2-3 decades.
The sea lift capacity issues or lack thereof are more troubling-