A recent piece from RUSI has provoked debate over the future of armored vehicles, examining how tanks can be adapted to the modern battlefield. It makes the case for preserving the main battle tank at the core of British force structure, comparing them to alternatives such as motorized/dismounted forces and IFVs. Although the discussion is tailored to the particular needs of the UK, most of the considerations hold more broadly.
I suspect that the potential effectiveness of hard-kill anti-drone systems isn't being taken seriously enough. Having watched a lot of FPV drone footage, in most strikes there is a several second window where an automated, optically controlled shotgun type weapon or even grenade launcher firing upward could likely trigger a premature warhead demolition if onboard EW systems fail.
Disaggregating protection from targets is an interesting idea, and totally agree that dozer blades need to be standard on tanks. But my assessment is that tanks will need to be equipped with anti-drone systems and EW to create a small bubble for infantry to operate. Almost like a small naval task force, tanks, IFVs, and scout vehicles work in groups of 6-8 to control a 2km x 2km box with support from fires and air/EW defense. Whether attacking or defending they operate as a cell seeking to stalk, ambush, and annihilate any forces in their assigned area.
Need digital simulations to test out all the possible configurations.
It's going to be an interesting period of experimentation, especially since it's the kind of thing that smaller defense firms can compete on - they don't need to design an entire tank in order to prove their concept.
It will be an interesting period of experimentation. Most of my armoured buddies are firmly in the 'platform based' defence camp i.e. that the way forward is vehicle mounted counter measures rather than disaggregation. And Andrew's point is well made because my key observation of FPV drone footage we see, is that there is a often a last minute 'blackout' that I think is likely to be EW jamming. When AI is able to manage terminal guidance through this phase, FPV lethality will increase again. So I suspect it protect may one day involve a CAP of fighter drones and some sort of kinetic close in weapon system taking us nicely back to the naval analogy.
A really good and thought provoking article. Thanks. Concentration is becoming increasingly difficult. After reading the article, I'd be really interested in your thoughts of artillery. It seems to me that an effective counter battery programme reduces the anti-tank threat of precision guided artillery and DPICM. However, I am really interested in the ability of artillery suppressive fire to limit the effectiveness of FPV drones. Especially, those operating locally perhaps by targeting key vantage points and using HE and Smoke. Or even firing cordon sanitaire around or on the flank a manoeuvring unit. Any thoughts?
Thanks Ben. Agree on suppressive fire and especially smoke. On the other hand, drone autonomy and saturation will make it increasingly difficult to hide anything - hard kill will remain the only reliable option.
It was always canon that you dug in when stationary unless there’s a good reason not to ...
When Patton said no digging in, advance , attack that was under conditions of total mobility supremacy and 🇺🇸 half the world’s gasoline, a totally mobile force, air supremacy.
It doesn’t make sense if you are stationary not to dig in.
What about mines? If you run your well-prepared and well-armored column in a well-placed minefield, its mostly game over. Is there another minefield after the first one? Is one adjuscent? And so on... Mines are to big issue not to be taken into account.
Mines are a tactical problem, they can only stop an entire column if part of a well-prepared defense that's blocking the only route forward. And in any case, armies of the future are going to need a whole lot more engineering assets of all types, mine-rollers/MICLICs included.
Author; are you taking Drone Counter Drone systems (Drones that kill Drones) into consideration?
Such as Anduril RoadRunner?
The sky can quickly enough become an unfriendly place as well.
It might be better and certainly cheaper to address the known problems rather than become dogmatic about Ukraine’s makeshift solutions and proceed to static warfare.
The problem is Drones, other Drones as well as many ground countermeasures can address.
- now we’ve needed to get serious about counter drones and integration of new tech for some time, the Russians certainly did doctrinally with drones, EW, however much the execution by mercenaries and LNR/DNR militia may have fallen short, or perhaps even regular forces. We’ve been serious about counter-insurgency for too long to the neglect of peer foes - Ukraine is in many ways a blessing of a warning to us.
How much was smoke, in particular IR and Thermal Obscurant Smoke used in Ukraine? IR obscurant smoke- This essentially being smoke with Brass powder flakes.
This equipment is in inventory in Chemical companies (M56 HUMMV /M58 M113 chassis).
To an extent it will somewhat thwart millimeter wave radar.
This is less a criticism that a plea of ignorance, but in my amateur reading of this, these protected positions don't lessen the time spent moving nor the vulnerability per unit of time/distance during them, so the attrition would remain the same. Is the point that significant stops are unavoidable and therefore lowering vulnerability during them is important, or/and that it makes intermittent suppression more effective by "going to ground" when it can't be sustained? (Suppression costs per time/distance would be the same, but I guess that lessens the logistical bandwith required?)
Sorry about the basic question - I'm sure I'm missing something.
That's exactly it, the majority of time during any major operation will be spent idling, refueling, doing maintenance, crew rest etc. In 2003 the US took 2 weeks to advance 500 km to Baghdad, and that was considered extremely fast. Planned movements between hardened positions can be synchronized with suppression, sparing demand for scarce assets.
In 2003, the US had air supremacy and had just about completely disrupted Iraqi command control except at the local level. So the advance was just limited to the supply train.
With a near peer or peer adversary it feels like what you are advocating is more “defense” (like adding more armor to a tank) thus slowing the advance even more.
So what new offensive capabilities or technologies do you think would return the balance to mobility and the offense?
Logistics will always be the limiting factor during breakouts - Iraq was comparable to the Germans' average pace in France and the USSR. Entrenching would slow things down, if for no reason than putting more vehicles on the road, but it's not obvious that it would be the biggest factor. It's the lead elements that need to dig in the most, and they're already moving far below their maximum speed (next piece is going to go into this more).
But failing that, I don't see anything that could restore mobility - other than total air supremacy, of course.
That can mean two different things: both sides they have enough SAMs that aircraft don't matter, or both sides have enough aircraft that air defenses don't matter. The first is what we're seeing now; the second ends up with one side gaining air superiority.
I’m probably going against doctrinal definitions- shouldn’t air parity or supremacy take the entire picture ADA and Air into consideration?
Without discounting the value of drones in particular loitering munitions, drone operations require a physically and electronically permissive environment to operate.
I don’t think we give up on mobility and go hard engineers (not that I’m not a big fan of engineers and digging deep and often) but if the drones can he countered directly then counter the drones. OF COURSE things have changed and change with them - but don’t bet it all on the new technology.
Recall in 1940 France’s Air Force bet hard on Bombers- and didn’t have enough fighter pilots to achieve full sortie rates. It’s quite possible to get ahead of yourself, which may be as bad as falling behind.
I suspect that the potential effectiveness of hard-kill anti-drone systems isn't being taken seriously enough. Having watched a lot of FPV drone footage, in most strikes there is a several second window where an automated, optically controlled shotgun type weapon or even grenade launcher firing upward could likely trigger a premature warhead demolition if onboard EW systems fail.
Disaggregating protection from targets is an interesting idea, and totally agree that dozer blades need to be standard on tanks. But my assessment is that tanks will need to be equipped with anti-drone systems and EW to create a small bubble for infantry to operate. Almost like a small naval task force, tanks, IFVs, and scout vehicles work in groups of 6-8 to control a 2km x 2km box with support from fires and air/EW defense. Whether attacking or defending they operate as a cell seeking to stalk, ambush, and annihilate any forces in their assigned area.
Need digital simulations to test out all the possible configurations.
It's going to be an interesting period of experimentation, especially since it's the kind of thing that smaller defense firms can compete on - they don't need to design an entire tank in order to prove their concept.
It will be an interesting period of experimentation. Most of my armoured buddies are firmly in the 'platform based' defence camp i.e. that the way forward is vehicle mounted counter measures rather than disaggregation. And Andrew's point is well made because my key observation of FPV drone footage we see, is that there is a often a last minute 'blackout' that I think is likely to be EW jamming. When AI is able to manage terminal guidance through this phase, FPV lethality will increase again. So I suspect it protect may one day involve a CAP of fighter drones and some sort of kinetic close in weapon system taking us nicely back to the naval analogy.
Agreed, that's where "drone swarms" will really appear—on the defense, not the offense.
Drill tanks digging tunnels underground.
Seismographs placed along defensive lines to detect them.
Artillery fired at or near said graphs to deafen them to drill tanks.
Soon (tm).
A really good and thought provoking article. Thanks. Concentration is becoming increasingly difficult. After reading the article, I'd be really interested in your thoughts of artillery. It seems to me that an effective counter battery programme reduces the anti-tank threat of precision guided artillery and DPICM. However, I am really interested in the ability of artillery suppressive fire to limit the effectiveness of FPV drones. Especially, those operating locally perhaps by targeting key vantage points and using HE and Smoke. Or even firing cordon sanitaire around or on the flank a manoeuvring unit. Any thoughts?
Thanks Ben. Agree on suppressive fire and especially smoke. On the other hand, drone autonomy and saturation will make it increasingly difficult to hide anything - hard kill will remain the only reliable option.
I will agree; if you can move, DIG.
If you are defending at all DIG.
On offense, we certainly need a big investment in Combat Engineers and equipment.
So agree.
Can’t move- correction.
It was always canon that you dug in when stationary unless there’s a good reason not to ...
When Patton said no digging in, advance , attack that was under conditions of total mobility supremacy and 🇺🇸 half the world’s gasoline, a totally mobile force, air supremacy.
It doesn’t make sense if you are stationary not to dig in.
Looks an interesting read. I've subscribed to read later. Thanks for sharing.
What about mines? If you run your well-prepared and well-armored column in a well-placed minefield, its mostly game over. Is there another minefield after the first one? Is one adjuscent? And so on... Mines are to big issue not to be taken into account.
Mines are a tactical problem, they can only stop an entire column if part of a well-prepared defense that's blocking the only route forward. And in any case, armies of the future are going to need a whole lot more engineering assets of all types, mine-rollers/MICLICs included.
Author; are you taking Drone Counter Drone systems (Drones that kill Drones) into consideration?
Such as Anduril RoadRunner?
The sky can quickly enough become an unfriendly place as well.
It might be better and certainly cheaper to address the known problems rather than become dogmatic about Ukraine’s makeshift solutions and proceed to static warfare.
The problem is Drones, other Drones as well as many ground countermeasures can address.
- now we’ve needed to get serious about counter drones and integration of new tech for some time, the Russians certainly did doctrinally with drones, EW, however much the execution by mercenaries and LNR/DNR militia may have fallen short, or perhaps even regular forces. We’ve been serious about counter-insurgency for too long to the neglect of peer foes - Ukraine is in many ways a blessing of a warning to us.
Yup, mentioned as function for drones screening AFVs.
Thanks.
How much was smoke, in particular IR and Thermal Obscurant Smoke used in Ukraine? IR obscurant smoke- This essentially being smoke with Brass powder flakes.
This equipment is in inventory in Chemical companies (M56 HUMMV /M58 M113 chassis).
To an extent it will somewhat thwart millimeter wave radar.
(FM 3-50 Smoke Operations).
It's used during attacks, but in nowhere near sufficient quantities to obscure the entire approach. Mostly BMPs concealing their dismounts.
I Need to find and dust off the WW2 smoke plans, and this Coldie but a goody FM 3-50 Smoke Operations (1990) Cold War .
https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm3-50%2890%29.pdf
Fantastic resource, imagine smoke will be making quite a comeback. Can only imagine having to mask up for every stop.
Yes those Brass powder particles might be a problem (IR/Thermal Obscurant is powdered Brass).
This is less a criticism that a plea of ignorance, but in my amateur reading of this, these protected positions don't lessen the time spent moving nor the vulnerability per unit of time/distance during them, so the attrition would remain the same. Is the point that significant stops are unavoidable and therefore lowering vulnerability during them is important, or/and that it makes intermittent suppression more effective by "going to ground" when it can't be sustained? (Suppression costs per time/distance would be the same, but I guess that lessens the logistical bandwith required?)
Sorry about the basic question - I'm sure I'm missing something.
That's exactly it, the majority of time during any major operation will be spent idling, refueling, doing maintenance, crew rest etc. In 2003 the US took 2 weeks to advance 500 km to Baghdad, and that was considered extremely fast. Planned movements between hardened positions can be synchronized with suppression, sparing demand for scarce assets.
Ah, that makes sense. Thanks!
In 2003, the US had air supremacy and had just about completely disrupted Iraqi command control except at the local level. So the advance was just limited to the supply train.
With a near peer or peer adversary it feels like what you are advocating is more “defense” (like adding more armor to a tank) thus slowing the advance even more.
So what new offensive capabilities or technologies do you think would return the balance to mobility and the offense?
Logistics will always be the limiting factor during breakouts - Iraq was comparable to the Germans' average pace in France and the USSR. Entrenching would slow things down, if for no reason than putting more vehicles on the road, but it's not obvious that it would be the biggest factor. It's the lead elements that need to dig in the most, and they're already moving far below their maximum speed (next piece is going to go into this more).
But failing that, I don't see anything that could restore mobility - other than total air supremacy, of course.
Is air parity not enough or at least mitigation? I’m more concerned with the future of mobility in general than tanks in particular.
That can mean two different things: both sides they have enough SAMs that aircraft don't matter, or both sides have enough aircraft that air defenses don't matter. The first is what we're seeing now; the second ends up with one side gaining air superiority.
I’m probably going against doctrinal definitions- shouldn’t air parity or supremacy take the entire picture ADA and Air into consideration?
Without discounting the value of drones in particular loitering munitions, drone operations require a physically and electronically permissive environment to operate.
I don’t think we give up on mobility and go hard engineers (not that I’m not a big fan of engineers and digging deep and often) but if the drones can he countered directly then counter the drones. OF COURSE things have changed and change with them - but don’t bet it all on the new technology.
Recall in 1940 France’s Air Force bet hard on Bombers- and didn’t have enough fighter pilots to achieve full sortie rates. It’s quite possible to get ahead of yourself, which may be as bad as falling behind.